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ABSTRACT
Information flow analysis prevents secret or untrusted data from
flowing into public or trusted sinks. Existing mechanisms cover
a wide array of options, ranging from lightweight taint analysis
to heavyweight information flow control that also considers im-
plicit flows. Dynamic analysis, which is particularly popular for
languages such as JavaScript, faces the question whether to invest
in analyzing flows caused by not executing a particular branch,
so-called hidden implicit flows. This paper addresses the questions
how common different kinds of flows are in real-world programs,
how important these flows are to enforce security policies, and how
costly it is to consider these flows. We address these questions in
an empirical study that analyzes 56 real-world JavaScript programs
that suffer from various security problems, such as code injection
vulnerabilities, denial of service vulnerabilities, memory leaks, and
privacy leaks. The study is based on a state-of-the-art dynamic
information flow analysis and a formalization of its core. We find
that implicit flows are expensive to track in terms of permissiveness,
label creep, and runtime overhead. We find a lightweight taint anal-
ysis to be sufficient for most of the studied security problems, while
for some privacy-related code, observable tracking is sometimes
required. In contrast, we do not find any evidence that tracking hid-
den implicit flows reveals otherwise missed security problems. Our
results help security analysts and analysis designers to understand
the cost-benefit tradeoffs of information flow analysis and provide
empirical evidence that analyzing implicit flows in a cost-effective
way is a relevant problem.
1 INTRODUCTION
JavaScript is at the heart of themodernweb, empowering rich client-
side applications and, more recently, also server-side applications.
While some language features, such as dynamism and flexibility,
explain this popularity, the lack of other features, such as language-
level protection and isolation mechanisms, open up a wide range of
integrity, availability, and confidentiality vulnerabilities [29]. As a
result, securing JavaScript applications has become a key challenge
for web application security. Unfortunately, existing browser-level
mechanisms, such as the same-origin policy or the content security
policy, are coarse-grained, falling short to distinguish between
secure and insecure manipulation of data by scripts. Furthermore,
server-side applications lack such isolation mechanisms completely,
allowing an attacker, e.g., to inject and execute arbitrary code that
interacts with the operating system through powerful APIs [46].
An appealing approach to securing JavaScript applications is
information flow analysis. This approach tracks the flow of infor-
mation from sources to sinks in order to enforce application-level
1 // variable passwd is sensitive
2 var gotIt = false;
3 var paddedPasswd = "xx" + passwd;
4 var knownPasswd = null;
5 if (paddedPasswd === "xxtopSecret") {
6 gotIt = true;
7 knownPasswd = passwd;
8 }
9 // function sink is insensitive
10 sink(gotIt);
Figure 1: Program leaking the password to the network.
security policies. It can ensure both integrity, by preventing infor-
mation from untrusted sources to reach trusted sinks, and confi-
dentiality, by preventing information from secret sources to reach
public sinks. For example, information flow analysis can check
that no attacker-controlled data is evaluated as executable code
or that secret user data is not sent to the network. Because the
dynamic nature of JavaScript hinders precise static analysis, dy-
namic information flow analysis has received significant attention
by researchers [6, 9, 11, 14, 17, 25, 27, 48]. The basic idea of dynamic
information flow analysis is to attach security labels, e.g., secret
(untrusted) and public (trusted), to runtime values and to propagate
these labels during program execution. To simplify the presentation,
we assume to have two security labels, and we say that a value is
sensitive if its label is secret or untrusted; otherwise, we say that a
value is insensitive.
At the language level, a program may propagate information via
two kinds of information flows:1 Explicit flows [20] occur when-
ever sensitive information is passed by an assignment statement
or into a sink. Implicit flows [20] arise via control-flow structures
of programs, e.g., conditionals and loops, when the flow of control
depends on a sensitive value. For a dynamic information flow anal-
ysis, implicit flows can be further classified into flows that happen
because a particular branch is executed, so-called observable implicit
flows [7], and flows that happen because a particular branch is not
executed, so called hidden implicit flows [7].
Figure 1 illustrates the different kinds of flows with a simple
JavaScript-like program that leaks sensitive information. The pro-
gram has a variable passwd, which is marked initially as a sensitive
source at line 1. Using this variable in an operation that creates
a new value, e.g., in line 3, is an explicit flow. Consider the case
where the password is “topSecret”, i.e., the conditional at line 5
evaluates to true, and line 6 sets gotIt to true. At line 10, the gotIt
1There are other kinds of flows, such as timing and cache side-channels, which we
ignore here.
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variable is sent to the network through the function sink(), which
is considered to be an insensitive sink. The flow from the password
to gotIt is an observable implicit flow because a sensitive value
determines that gotIt gets written. Now, consider the case where
passwd is “abc”. The branch at line 5 is not taken and the gotIt
variable remains false. Sending this information to the network
reveals that the password is different from “topSecret”. This flow
is a hidden implicit flow because a sensitive value determines that
gotIt does not get written.
Ideally, an information flow analysis should consider all three
kinds of flows. In fact, there exists a large body of work on static,
dynamic, hybrid, and multi-execution techniques to prevent explicit
and implicit flows. However, so far these tools have seen little use in
practice, despite the strong security guarantees that they provide. In
contrast, a lightweight form of information flow analysis called taint
analysis is widely used in computer security [42]. Taint analysis
is a pure data dependency analysis that only tracks explicit flows,
ignoring any control flow dependencies.
The question which kinds of flows to consider is a tradeoff be-
tween costs and benefits. On the cost side, considering more flows
increases false positives [32]. A false positive here means that a
secure execution is conservatively blocked by an overly restrictive
enforcement mechanism. A common reason is that a value gets
labeled as sensitive even though it does not actually contain infor-
mation that is security-relevant in practice. This problem, some-
times referred to as label creep [18, 39], reduces the permissiveness
of information flow monitoring, because the monitor will prema-
turely stop a program to prevent a value with an overly sensitive
label from reaching a sink. Another cost of considering more kinds
of flows is an increase in runtime overhead. On the benefit side,
considering more flows increases the ability to find security vulner-
abilities and data leakages, i.e., the level of trust one obtains from
the analysis. For example, an analysis that considers only explicit
flows will miss any leakage of sensitive data that involves an im-
plicit flow. Unfortunately, despite the large volume of research on
information flow analysis, there is very little empirical evidence on
the importance of the different kinds of flows in real applications.
Because of this lack of knowledge, potential users of information
flow analyses cannot make an informed decision about what kind
of analysis to use.
To better understand the tradeoff between costs and benefits
of using a dynamic information flow analysis, this paper presents
an empirical study of information flows in real-world JavaScript
code. Our overall goal is to better understand the costs and ben-
efits of dynamically analyzing explicit, observable implicit, and
hidden implicit flows. Specifically, we are interested in how preva-
lent different kinds of flows are, what kinds of security problems
can(not) be detected when considering subsets of flows, and what
costs considering all flows imposes. To address these questions,
we study 56 real-world JavaScript programs in various application
domains with a diverse set of security policies. The study considers
integrity problems, specifically code injection vulnerabilities and
denial of service vulnerabilities caused by an algorithmic complex-
ity problem, and confidentiality problems, specifically leakages of
uninitialized memory, browser fingerprinting and history sniffing.
Each studied program has at least one real-world security problem
that information flow analysis can detect.
Our study is enabled by a novel methodology that combines
state-of-the-art dynamic information flow analysis [5, 25, 26] and
program rewriting [12] with a set of novel security metrics. We
implement the methodology in a dynamic information flow anal-
ysis built on top of Jalangi [43]. The implementation draws on a
sound analysis for a simple core of JavaScript. The formalization
relates the security metrics to semantic security conditions for
taint tracking [41], observable tracking [7] and information flow
monitoring [24].
The findings of our study include:
(1) All three kinds of flows occur locally in real-life applications, i.e.,
an analysis that ignores some of them risks to miss violations of
the information flow policy. Explicit flows are by far the most
prevalent, and only five benchmarks contain hidden implicit
flows (Section 4.1).
(2) An analysis that considers explicit and observable implicit flows,
but ignores hidden implicit flows, detects all vulnerabilities in
our benchmarks. For most applications it is even sufficient to
track explicit flows only, while for some client-side, privacy-
related applications one must also consider observable implicit
flows (Section 4.2).
(3) Tracking hidden implicit flows causes an analysis to prema-
turely terminate various executions. Furthermore, we find that
different monitoring strategies proposed in the literature vary
significantly in their permissiveness. (Section 4.3).
(4) The amount of data labeled as sensitive steadily increases during
the execution of most benchmarks, confirming the label creep
problem. An analysis that considers implicit flows increases the
label creep by over 40% compared to an analysis that considers
only explicit flows (Section 4.4).
(5) The analysis overhead caused by considering implicit flows is
significant: Ignoring implicit flows saves the effort of tracking
runtime operations by a factor of 2.5 times (Section 4.5).
Prior work (discussed in Section 5) studies false positives caused
by static analysis of implicit flows [32, 38] and the semantic strength
of flows [34]. Jang et al. [28] conduct a large-scale empirical study
showing that several popular web sites use information flows to ex-
filtrate data about users’ behavior. Kang et al. [30] combine dynamic
taint analysis with targeted implicit flow analysis, demonstrating
the importance of tracking implicit flows for trusted programs.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no existing work addresses
the above questions.
In summary, this paper contributes the following:
• We are the first to empirically study the prevalence of explicit,
observable implicit, and hidden implicit flows in real-world appli-
cations against integrity, availability, and confidentiality policies.
• Wepresent amethodology and its implementation, which enables
the study, and we provide a formal basis for empirically studying
information flows (Section 3).
• We show the soundness of the analysis for a core of JavaScript
with respect to semantic security conditions (Appendix).
• Through realistic case studies and security policies, we provide
empirical evidence that sheds light on the cost-benefit tradeoff
of information analysis and that outlines directions for future
work (Section 4).
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We share our implementation, as well as all benchmarks and poli-
cies used for the study, to support future evaluations of information
flow tools for JavaScript.2
2 BENCHMARKS AND SECURITY POLICIES
Our study is based on 56 client-side and server-side JavaScript
applications, which suffer from four classes of vulnerabilities. These
applications are subject to attacks that have been independently
discovered by existing work, including integrity, availability, and
confidentiality attacks. For every application, we define realistic
security policies expressed as information flow policies. Table 1
shows the applications, along with their security policies, and size
measured in lines of code. The benchmarks vary in size from tens
of lines of code to tens of thousands. We further explain the policies
below. For each application we either create or reuse a set of inputs
that trigger the attack and other inputs to increase the coverage of
different behaviors.
Our goal is an in-depth study of the different kinds of information
flows for a range of security policies; we do not claim to study a
representative sample of JavaScript applications. Existing in-breadth
empirical studies, which analyze hundreds of thousands of web
pages against fixed policies, provide clear evidence for security and
privacy risks in JavaScript code [27, 33, 35]. In contrast to these
large-scale studies, our effort consists in identifying vulnerable
scripts from different domains and analyzing the flows therein.
Injection vulnerabilities on Node.js The Node.js ecosystem
has enabled a proliferation of server and desktop applications writ-
ten in JavaScript. Injection vulnerabilities are programming errors
that enable an attacker to inject and execute malicious code. Recent
work [46] has demonstrated the devastating impact of injection
vulnerabilities on server-side programs, e.g., when an attacker-
controlled string reaches powerful APIs such as exec or eval. Such
attacks can severely compromise integrity, e.g., deleting all files
in a directory or completely controlling the attacked machine. We
study 19 Node.js modules that contain injection vulnerabilities (IDs
1 to 19 in Table 1). As security policies, we consider the interface of
a module as an untrusted source and the APIs that interpret strings
as code, such as exec or eval, as trusted sinks.
ReDoS vulnerabilities Regular expression Denial of Service, or
ReDoS, is a form of algorithmic complexity attack that exploits
the possibly long time of matching a regular expression against
an attacker-crafted input. The single-threaded execution model of
JavaScript makes JavaScript-based web servers particularly suscep-
tible to ReDoS attacks [45]. We analyze 19 web server applications
that are subject to ReDoS attacks (IDs 20 to 39 in Table 1). As a
security policy, we consider data received via HTTP requests as
untrusted sources and regular expressions known to be vulnerable
as trusted sinks.
2https://new-iflow.herokuapp.com/download-iflow.html
3https://www.privacytool.org/AnonymityChecker/
4http://www.lalit.org/lab/javascript-css-font-detect/
5https://browserleaks.com/js/donottrack.js
6https://robinlinus.github.io/socialmedia- leak/
7https://www.privacytool.org/AnonymityChecker/
8https://popmyads.com/
9https://browserleaks.com/firefox#more
Table 1: Insecure programs, security policies, program size,
sensitive branch coverage and number of upgrades. "mod-
ule" stands for the module interface.
ID Library Policy LoC SBC Upgs
1 fish module→ eval and exec 69 1 0
2 growl module→ eval and exec 270 1 0
3 gm module→ eval and exec 1,614 1 0
4 libnotify module→ eval and exec 54 1 0
5 mixin-pro module→ eval and exec 168 1 0
6 modulify module→ eval and exec 2,410 1 0
7 mol-proto module→ eval and exec 1,696 1 0
8 mongoosify module→ eval and exec 160 0 1
9 m-log module→ eval and exec 243 1 0
10 mobile-icon-resizer file system API→ eval and exec 410 1 0
11 mongo-parse module→ eval and exec 506 1 0
12 mongoosemask module→ eval and exec 12,750 0.78 28
13 mongui HTTP API→ eval and exec 1,539 0.44 0
14 mongo-edit HTTP API→ eval and exec 577 0 0
15 mock2easy HTTP API→ eval and exec 1,217 0.07 3
16 chook-growl-reporter module→ eval and exec 243 1 0
17 git2json module→ eval and exec 434 1 0
18 kerb_request module→ eval and exec 67 1 0
19 printer module→ eval and exec 139 1 0
20 debug module→ regex matching 360 1 0
21 mime module→ regex matching 108 1 0
22 tough-cookie module→ regex matching 1,145 1 0
23 fresh module→ regex matching 59 0.5 0
24 forwarded module→ regex matching 30 0 0
25 underscore.string module→ regex matching 1,779 1 0
26 ua-parser-js module→ regex matching 584 0.50 6
27 parsejson module→ regex matching 46 1 0
28 useragent module→ regex matching 6,827 1 0
29 no-case module→ regex matching 33 1 0
30 content-type-parser module→ regex matching 221 1 0
31 timespan module→ regex matching 577 0.20 4
32 string module→ regex matching 2,001 1 0
33 content module→ regex matching 125 0.42 0
34 slug module→ regex matching 375 0.5 2
35 htmlparser module→ regex matching 2,155 0.65 5
36 charset module→ regex matching 49 0.5 0
37 mobile-detect module→ regex matching 612 1 0
38 ismobilejs module→ regex matching 935 0.33 1
39 dns-sync module→ regex matching 76 1 0
40 ip buffer reading→ module 325 0.76 0
41 concat-stream buffer reading→ module 132 1 0
42 bl buffer reading→ module 206 0.72 4
43 request buffer reading→ HTTP 2,217 0.52 0
44 ws buffer reading→ HTTP API 2,449 0.07 1
45 floody buffer reading→ HTTP API 94 0.8 0
46 tunnel-agent buffer reading→ HTTP API 225 1 0
47 History sniffing [27] HTMLElement.color→ img.src 42 0 3
48 Font fingerpr. [3] HTMLElement.offsetWidth→ img.src 145 0.5 1
49 Font fingerpr.3 HTMLElement.offsetWidth→ img.src 44 0.02 3
50 Font fingerpr.4 HTMLElement.offsetWidth→ img.src 134 1 0
51 Browser ext. fin-
gerpr. [44]
HTMLElement.offsetWidth → re-
quest.open
1,451 1 1
52 DoNotTrack leakage5 navigator_doNotTrack → HTMLEle-
ment.html
20 0 1
53 Login state leakage6 onload event→ document.innerHTML 191 1 0
54 Engine fingerpr.7 HTMLElement.type→ console.log 129 0 1
55 Browser ext. fingerpr.8 onload event → HTMLEle-
ment.innerHTML
37 0 0
56 Resource fingerpr.9 onload event→ console.log 43 0 0
Buffer vulnerabilities Buffer vulnerabilities expose memory
content filled with previously used data, e.g., cryptographic keys,
source code, or system information. In Node.js, such vulnerabilities
occur when using the Buffer constructor without explicit initializa-
tion. Buffer vulnerabilities are similar to the infamous Heartbleed
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Table 2: Monitoring strategies (“Expl.” = explicit, “Obs.” = ob-
servable implicit, “Hid.” = hidden implicit).
Strategy Sec. condition Tracked flows Permissiveness
Expl. Obs. Hid.
Taint tracking Explicit secrecy ✓ Stop when H -labeled
value reaches sink.
Observable tracking Observable secrecy ✓ ✓ Stop when H -labeled
value reaches sink.
No Sensitive Upgrade Non-interference ✓ ✓ ✓ Stop when L-labeled
variable is written in
sensitive context.
Permissive Upgrade Non-interference ✓ ✓ ✓ Stop when partially
leaked value is used.
flaw in OpenSSL [22], as both allow an attacker to read more mem-
ory than intended. We analyze 7 applications subject to buffer
vulnerabilities (IDs 40 to 46 in Table 1). The security policy requires
that no information flows from the buffer allocation constructor to
HTTP requests without initialization.
Device fingerprinting and history sniffing Web-based finger-
printing collects device-specific information, e.g., installed fonts or
browser extensions, to identify users [2]. History sniffing attacks
use the fact that browsers display links differently depending on
whether the target has been visited [27, 49]. We analyze 10 client-
side JavaScript applications that are subject to various forms of
fingerprinting and history sniffing attacks (IDs 47 to 56 in Table 1).
The security policies label as secret the sources that provide sen-
sitive information, e.g., the font height and width, and as public
sinks the APIs that enable external communication, e.g., image tags.
We adapt these programs to our Node.js-based infrastructure by
introducing minimal changes that emulate DOM interactions. We
carefully cross-checked this adaptations in a pair-programming
fashion, ensuring that all flows in the original program are pre-
served. The policies are application-specific and mark certain nodes
in the emulated DOM as sources and sinks. In contrast to the other
benchmarks, these programs can potentially be malicious [27, 37].
That is, the assumption that the analyzed code is trusted does no
longer hold.
3 METHODOLOGY
To address the research questions from Section 1, we present a
methodology that combines a set of novel metrics with a dynamic
information flow analysis [25, 26], a monitoring strategy [5], and an
automated mechanism to insert upgrade statements [12]. The met-
rics summarize the flows observed during the program execution.
This section provides the necessary background on information
flow analysis, an informal description of our methodology, and
definitions of the metrics. It also presents a formalization of the
core of our methodology.
3.1 Setting: Information Flow Analysis
Security labels An information flow analysis associates each
value with a security label that indicates how sensitive the value
is. Labels are typically arranged in a lattice [19]. To ease the pre-
sentation, we focus on two labels: H (for high or sensitive) and L
(for low or insensitive), where H is more sensitive than L. Given a
label ℓ ∈ {H ,L}, we write vℓ to denote that a value v has security
label ℓ. If a value v does not have a label, we assume it is implicitly
labeled as L.
Information flow policy The analysis checks whether data
from a sensitive source influences data that arrives at an insen-
sitive sink. The sources and sinks for a program are specified in an
information flow policy, or short, policy. For integrity, the policy
specifies that no information from untrusted sources (H ) reaches
trusted sinks (L). For confidentiality, the policy stipulates that no
information from secret sources (H ) reaches public sinks (L). We
model sources by variables and object fields, and their security label
corresponds to the label of the value that they contain initially. We
denote sinks by a function sink(), which is implicitly labeled as L.
Monitoring strategies Different monitoring strategies for dy-
namic information flow analysis address the problem of checking
whether an execution violates a policy. In this work, we focus on
flow-sensitive dynamic monitors, where variables can be assigned
different security labels during the execution. Table 2 gives an
overview of the monitoring strategies studied in this paper. Taint
analysis tracks only explicit flows and stops the program only if an
H -labeled value reaches a sink.
In contrast to taint tracking, the other two strategies also track
implicit flows. The monitors identify implicit flows by maintaining
a security stack that contains all sensitive labels of expressions
in conditionals that influence the control flow. When the stack is
non-empty, the program executes in a sensitive context. Observable
Tracking [7] tracks only explicit and observable implicit flows, but
ignores hidden implicit flows. Whenever an L-labeled variable is
updated in a sensitive context, observable tracking updates the
label as sensitive and continues with the execution. For example,
consider the following program, which is trivially secure because
there is no call to sink():
1 var location; var y; var z;
2 if (10 < location < 20) {
3 y = "Home"; }
4 // upgrade(y);
5 z = "You are at " + y;
Consider now an execution where the location is 15H . Observ-
able tracking updates the labels of y and z as sensitive and does not
stop the execution.
The strictest monitoring strategies try to prevent also hidden im-
plicit flows. We consider two variants of such a strategy. They both
terminate the execution of the program whenever an observable
implicit flow may lead to a hidden implicit flow in another execu-
tion. The No Sensitive Upgrade strategy (NSU) [4, 50] disallows
updating the security labels of a variable in a sensitive context. In
particular, it terminates the execution whenever such an update
happens. For example, consider the execution of the above program
with location=15H . The NSU strategy terminates the program at
line 3 due to the update of the L-labeled variable y in a sensitive
context.
Permissive Upgrade (PU) [5] is a refinement of the NSU strategy.
It labels a value as partially leaked if an L-labeled variable is updated
in a sensitive context, and terminates the program if the updated
variable is further used outside the sensitive context. Consider again
the same execution of the above program. The PU strategy labels
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y as partially leaked at line 3 because the program writes to the
L-labeled variable in a sensitive context, and then terminates the
program at line 5 because the value is used. In our work, we use
the PU strategy to study the prevalence of different kinds of flows.
Upgrade statements Naively applying the PU strategy to real-
world programs can be very restrictive and risks to increase the
number of false positives, i.e., terminate many secure executions.
To address this problem, Austin and Flanagan propose the upgrade
statement [4] and the privatization statement [5]. These statements
change the label of a variable to H explicitly, to signal a potential
hidden implicit flow to the monitor. For example, we can insert an
upgrade statement before line 5 in the above example to mark y as
sensitive even if the branch is not taken. As a result, the program
does not terminate immediately when the value is read. If the
programwould later call sink(y), then themonitor would terminate
the program and report a policy violation.
Permissiveness The above example illustrates the permissive-
ness issues of different monitoring strategies, i.e., that they termi-
nate the program unnecessarily even though no policy violation
occurs. Taint tracking and observable tracking both do not ter-
minate the program. In contrast, both NSU and PU terminate the
program unnecessarily. This overapproximation of policy viola-
tions is necessary to avoid potential hidden implicit flows. Adding
upgrade statements avoids such premature termination of the pro-
gram by assigning anH -label to y, independently of what branch of
the conditional statement is executed. If we uncomment line 4, the
execution proceeds without terminating the program unnecessarily.
That is, upgrade statements may increase the permissiveness, but
impose the cost of adding upgrade statements.
3.2 Security Metrics
Our approach uses program testing to measure the prevalence of
different kinds of information flows. The basic idea is to test a pro-
gram with an information flow monitor that implements the PU
strategy, while incrementing counters that represent the number of
explicit, observable implicit, and hidden implicit flows. These coun-
ters then allow us to reason about the prevalence of the different
kinds of flows and about the policy violations that different moni-
toring strategies would detect. In contrast to the PU monitor that
terminates the program when it encounters a policy violation, our
monitor continues the execution to measure flows in the remainder
of the execution. We refer to Section 3.3 for the formal definition
of the monitor.
We consider information flows at two levels of granularity. On
the one hand, we consider flows induced by a single operation
in the program (Section 3.2.1). We call such flows micro flows or
simply flows. Studying flows at the micro flow level is worthwhile
because it provides a detailed understanding of the operations
that contribute to higher-level flows. In particular, flows provide
a quantitative answer to the permissiveness challenges faced by
state-of-the-art dynamic monitors that implement the NSU or the
PU strategy. On the other hand, we consider transitive flows of
information between a source and a sink, called source-to-sink flows
(Section 3.2.3). Studying flows at this coarse-grained level is worth-
while because source-to-sink flows are what security analysts are
interested in when using an information flow analysis.
The metrics presented in this section measure the prevalence of
flows quantitatively, and do not attempt to judge the importance of
flows. To ensure that our flows represent relevant problems, our
study uses real-world security problems and policies that capture
these issues.
3.2.1 Micro Flows. To measure how many explicit, observable
implicit, and hidden implicit flows exist, our monitor increments
the counters for these micro flows as follows.
Explicit flows The approach counts an explicit flow for every
assignment event where the written value is sensitive but the value
that gets overwritten (if any) is not sensitive. The rationale is to
capture program behavior where sensitive information flows to a
memory location that stores insensitive information. In contrast,
overwriting a sensitive value with another (in)sensitive value does
not leak any new information, and therefore does not count as an
explicit flow.
For example, consider this code:
1 var x = 3H ; var y = 5H ; var z;
2 x = y; // no explicit flow
3 z = x; // explicit flow
Observable implicit flows The approach counts an observable
implicit flow for every assignment event that happens in a sensitive
context and that overwrites an insensitive value. Similar to explicit
flows, the rationale is to capture program behavior that writes
sensitive information to a memory location that stores insensitive
information. The main difference is that the assignment happens
because of a control flow decision made based on a sensitive context.
Note that it is irrelevant whether the written value is sensitive
because the fact that a write happens leaks sensitive information.
For example, consider this code:
1 var x = trueH ; var y = 3; var z;
2 if (x)
3 y = 5; // observable implicit flow
4 z = 7; // no flow
Hidden implicit flows The approach counts a hidden implicit
flow for every execution of an upgrade statement of a variable
containing insensitive information. The rationale is to capture as-
signment events that did not happen, but that could have happened
during the execution if a control flow decision that depends on a
sensitive value would have been different.
For example, consider this code:
1 var x = falseH ; var y; var z;
2 if (x)
3 y = 5; // not executed , no flow
4 upgrade(y); // hidden implicit flow
5 z = y; // hidden implicit flow
3.2.2 Label Creep. Asmentioned earlier, a common reason for false
positives is label creep. Since measuring false positives would be
subject to a given source-to-sink policy, we focus on measuring the
prevalence of the more general phenomenon of label creep in micro
flows. Recall that this concept refers to the fact that information
flow analysis may quickly label a large portion of all values handled
in a program as sensitive. In most of the cases, this leads to an
explosion in false positives that in turn reduces the usefulness of
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the analysis. We propose a novel metric called Label Creep Ratio
(LCR) to assess how many variables and object fields in memory
are labeled as sensitive.
LCR =
# sensitive variables/fields ever assigned
# variables/fields ever assigned
For a given monitoring strategy, the Label Creep Ratio is the ra-
tio between the number of assignments of H -labeled values and
the total number of assignments. Intuitively, measuring the LCR
throughout an execution estimates the speed at which the memory
locations get assigned sensitive labels.
3.2.3 Source-to-sink Flows. To what degree do different kinds of
flows contribute to policy violations? To address this question, we
consider transitive flows from a source of sensitive information to
a sink of insensitive information. For instance, none of the flows in
the examples above correspond to a source-to-sink flow, since no
sink statement is present.
Now, consider the code:
1 var x = falseH ; var y; var z;
2 if (x)
3 y = 5;
4 upgrade(y); // hidden micro flow
5 z = x; // explicit micro flow
6 sink(y); // source -to-sink flow
The program contains two micro flows and one source-to-sink
flow. However, if the execution is analyzed with taint tracking or
observable tracking, the source-to-sink flow is missed, because it
occurs only due to the upgrade statement.
As another example, consider the following code:
1 var x = trueH ; var y; var z;
2 if (x)
3 y = 5; // observable flow
4 z = x; // explicit flow
5 sink(y+z); // source -to-sink flow
The source-to-sink flow will be detected by all three kinds of
monitoring strategies, because the variable z gets labeled H via an
explicit micro flow and then gets passed to the sink.
As illustrated by these two examples, we measure how many
source-to-sink flows different monitoring strategies detect by track-
ing what micro flows contribute to a source-to-sink flow. Further-
more, to count the number of unique source-to-sink flows that
a monitor detects, we compute the set of source code locations
involved in each source-to-sink flow. If the code locations of two
source-to-sink flows are the same, we count them as only one
unique flow. This corresponds to the way a human security analyst
would inspect warnings produced by an analysis.
3.2.4 Inference of Upgrade Statements. The approach described
so far requires a program that indicates hidden implicit flows
through upgrade statements. To obtain such a program, we adapt a
testing-based technique for automatically inserting upgrade state-
ments [12]. The basic idea is to repeatedly execute the programwith
a particular policy, to monitor the execution for potentially missed
hidden implicit flows (using the PU strategy [5], see Section 3.1),
and to insert upgrade statements that signal them to the monitor
when counting micro flows. Whenever the monitor terminates the
program because it detects an access to a value u that is marked as
partially leaked, the approach modifies the program by inserting
an upgrade statement at the code location where u is next used;
this upgrade statement in the modified program will then be ex-
ecuted whenever u is used again, regardless of whether the same
branch that leads to the insertion of the upgrade statement is taken.
The process continues until it reaches a fixed point, i.e., until the
program has enough upgrade statements for the given tests.
The ability of our analysis to observe hidden implicit flows de-
pends on the completeness of the inferred upgrade statements, since
missing upgrade statements may result in false negatives for hid-
den implicit flows. How often this occurs depends on how well the
analyzed executions cover the branches of the programs. One way
to assess this ability would be to measure tradition branch coverage,
i.e., the percentage of all branches that are covered by the given test
inputs. However, traditional branch coverage is only of limited use
because inserting upgrade statements does not rely on covering all
branches in the code, but only on a subset. Specifically, the ability
to insert upgrade statements depends on the branch coverage for
conditionals that depend on sensitive values. We present a metric
called Sensitive Branch Coverage (SBC) that captures this idea:
SBC =
|{c ∈ C where both true and false branch covered}|
|C |
where C is the set of conditionals that depend on a sensitive
value. For example, consider executing the following program with
x=falseH :
1 var x; var y
2 if (x)
3 y = 5;
The setC consists of the conditional at line 2, but since the execution
covers only the false branch, SBC = 01 = 0.
3.3 Formalization of Flows and Conditions
We define the syntax and semantics of NanoJS, a simplified core of
JavaScript to illustrate the flow counting performed by our imple-
mentation.
Notation: We denote empty sequences by ε . Concatenating two
sequences τ1 and τ2 is denoted by τ1.τ2. Slightly abusing notation,
we also use the same notation to prepend a single element α to a
sequence τ by writing α .τ . Similarly, we write α ∈ τ to denote that
α occurs in sequence τ .
NanoJS syntax: NanoJS statements:
Stmt ::= skip | ε | c1; c2 | sink(e) | x = e | x [y] = e |
if (e) { c1 } else { c2 } | while e do c
where x, y ∈ Name, and e ∈ Expr
A terminated execution is denoted by ε . All function calls to
sinks with expression e are modeled by sink(e); other function
calls are not considered in NanoJS.
Semantics: Operationally, the constructs in NanoJS behave
as in standard imperative languages. To count micro flows, we
associate each primitive value with a tuple κ : Cnt of flow counts,
where Cnt = N3. A tuple (e,o,h) ∈ Cnt denotes e explicit flows, o
observable flows, and h hidden flows. A value is either a primitive
value annotated with a flow count, or an address on the heap. We
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assume that there is a set Base of primitive base types, such as
boolean, numbers, and strings. A heap object o ∈ Obj maps a finite
set of names to values. We write tt for boolean value true and ff
for boolean value false.
We use flow counts to track how information is propagated by a
program, analogous to labels in other information flow monitors.
We define a join-semilattice structure for flow counts as follows. In-
tuitively, a non-zero flow count indicates a sensitive value, whereas
if all flow counts are zero, the value is insensitive: The join of two
flow counts is defined as κ1 ⊔ κ2 = κ1 + κ2, where κ1 + κ2 denotes
the pointwise addition of the two flow counts. Two flow counts
satisfy κ1 ⊑ κ2 if whenever κ2 = (0, 0, 0) then κ1 = (0, 0, 0).
A configuration ⟨c, ρ,h, t ,κ⟩ consists of a statement c ∈ Stmt, an
environment ρ : Name → Value mapping variable names to values,
a heap h : Addr → Obj, a stack of security levels t ∈ L⋆, and a
sink counter κ : Cnt counting flows reaching sink statements; we
denote the set of configurations by Conf . An execution of a NanoJS
program yields a trace Tr = Value⋆ indicating outputs produced
by the execution.
We now define the small-step semantics of NanoJS. A step ⟨c, ρ,
h, t ,κ⟩ τ−→ ⟨c ′, ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′⟩ denotes a single evaluation step produc-
ing trace τ . We write ε for a terminated execution. Slightly abusing
notation, we define
⊔(h,v) as the join of all labels occurring in
value v with heap h. For simplicity, we assume that there are no
cyclical references on the heap.
The function upgrade(x , ρ,h) denotes the pair (ρ ′,h′), where
the hidden flow count of all components of the value of a vari-
able x ∈ Name is incremented by 1. To update flow counts, we
use an auxiliary function ∆ : Cnt × Cnt × Cnt⋆ → (Cnt). In-
tuitively, ∆(κold , ℓnew , t) increments the explicit and observable
flow counters for assigning a value with flow count κnew to a
location with label κold while the security stack is t . We define
∆(κold ,κnew , t) = (∆e ,∆o , 0) where ∆e =
{
1 κnew ̸⊑ κold
0 otherwise
and
∆o =
{
1 ℓold = 0 ∧
⊔
t , 0
0 otherwise
To define observations based on references passed to sinks, we
use a helper function toVal(h,v) : {Base × Name⋆} that, given a
value, returns all references to heap objects reachable from the
value. We denote evaluating an expression e in environment ρ and
heap h by JeK(ρ,h). The rules propagate flow counts into the result
values; for example, adding two values with one explicit flow each
will result in two explicit flows in the result. We assume, contrary
to real-world JavaScript, that expressions do not have side effects.
Finally, Figure 2 gives the rules of small-step operational seman-
tics for NanoJS with flow counting. The way the rules modify the
environment and heap is standard. Some standard rules are omitted
and provided in the appendix. In addition to the standard execution
of a program, the semantics also track flow counts for each value.
For example, an assignment statement x = e propagates the flow
counts of the assigned expression e and additionally increments
the explicit flow count if e has non-zero flows and the observable
flow count if the control-flow path is determined by sensitive data.
A sink statement sink(e) increments global counts representing
source-to-sink flows. Since all sink statements model writes to
E-AssignJxK(ρ, h) = vx κx =⊔(h, vx ) JeK(ρ, h) = vκe
κ′ = κe + ∆(ℓx , ℓe , t ) v ′ = vκ′ ρ′ = ρ[x 7→ v ′]
⟨x = e, ρ, h, t, κ ⟩ −→ ⟨ε, ρ′, h, t, κ ⟩
E-If
JeK(ρ, h) = vκ i = {1 v = tt
2 otherwise
⟨if (e) { c1 } else { c2 }, ρ, t, κ ⟩ −→ ⟨ci ; pop, ρ, κ .t ′, κ ⟩
E-SinkJeK(ρ, h) = vκ κa =⊔(v, h) κ′ = κ + κa + ∆(0, κa, t )
⟨sink(e), ρ, h, t, κ ⟩ toVal(h,v )−−−−−−−−→ ⟨ε, ρ, t, κ′⟩
E-UpgradeL JxK(ρ, h) = v0
v ′ = v (0,0,1) (ρ′, h′) = upgrade(x, ρ[x 7→ v ′], h)
⟨upgrade(x ), ρ, h, t, κ ⟩ −→ ⟨ε, ρ′, h′, t, κ ⟩
Figure 2: Rules for NanoJS with flow counting.
insensitive sinks, any write of an expression with non-zero flow
counts will result in incrementing the global counters.
Security conditions: We also adapt existing security condi-
tions for tracking only explicit or observable flows to NanoJS [7]. To
capture only explicit flows, we use the notion of explicit secrecy; intu-
itively, a run of a program satisfies explicit secrecy if and only if the
program obtained by sequentially composing all non-control-flow
commands executed during that run does not leak information. For
example, the program if (h) { l = 1 } else { l = 2 } ; sink(l) would
produce the extracted programs l = 1 ; sink(l) or l = 2 ; sink(l)
depending on the value of h in a given run. In both cases, the ex-
tracted program contains prohibited information flows, since the
source program only leaks information through an implicit flow.
To track only explicit and observable implicit flows, we keep
branching constructs in the extracted program, but replace not
taken branches by skip. If the extracted program does not leak sen-
sitive information, then the run satisfies observable secrecy. For ex-
ample, in the program l = 0 ; if (h) { l = 1 } else { skip } ; sink(l),
observable secrecy would extract either l = 0 ; if (h) { l =
1 } else { skip } ; sink(l) or l = 0 ; if (h) { skip } else { skip } ;
sink(l). This matches the intuition that an observable flow only
occurs in the run where h is tt, where the assignment l = 1 is
executed, but not in a run where h is ff, since this run only leaks
information through a hidden implicit flow; i.e. the extracted pro-
gram when h = tt leaks information, but the extracted program for
h = ff does not. Appendix A gives formal definitions of the two
notions.
Soundness: To establish soundness of our counting scheme,
we show that if all explicit flow counts for all sinks for a given run
are 0, then that run satisfies explicit secrecy. Similarly, we show
that if all explicit and observable flow counts are 0, the run satisfies
observable secrecy. The formal theorem statements and proofs can
be found in Appendices B and C.
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3.4 Implementation
To implement our methodology, we develop a tool for dynamic
information flow analysis following Hedin at al. [25, 26]. The imple-
mentation builds on Jalangi [43], a dynamic analysis framework for
JavaScript that uses source-to-source transformation. Since Jalangi
supports ECMAScript 5 only, we down-compile programs written
in newer versions of the language with Babel [1]. Building on top
of Jalangi allows us to focus on the important parts of the analysis
and let the framework handle otherwise challenging aspects of
implementing a dynamic information flow analysis, e.g., on the fly
instrumentation of code produced by eval, exceptional termina-
tion of functions, boxing and unboxing of primitive values [14].
We handle higher-order functions and track dynamic modification
of object properties as described by Hedin et al. [26]. Our policy
language is expressive, allowing the security analyst to mark both
functions and arguments of callbacks as sources.
To approximate the effects of native calls, we model them by
transferring the labels from all parameters to the return value. More-
over, if one of the parameter is an object, we propagate labels from
all its properties to the return value. For a set of frequently used na-
tive functions, such as Array.push, Array.forEach, Object.call,
and Object.defineProperty, we create richer models that propa-
gate labels more precisely. To increase the confidence in our imple-
mentation, we created more than 100 validation tests that assert the
correctness of label propagation in typical usage scenarios. When
inserting upgrades, the implementation does not modify the actual
source code but it stores the source code locations of upgrades, and
then performs the upgrades at runtime.
4 EMPIRICAL STUDY
This section presents the results of our empirical study that assesses
the costs and benefits of tracking different kinds of flows.
The last two columns of Table 1 show the sensitive branch cov-
erage (SBC) and the number of upgrades inserted while executing
the benchmarks. Overall, the tests used for the study reach a high
SBC, for 54% of the programs even 100%, enabling the analysis to
insert upgrade statements. For each of the considered benchmarks,
our tool can detect source-to-sink flows. This is hardly surprising,
since we already know that the programs contain such flows, but it
shows that our tool can handle complex, real-life JavaScript code.
4.1 Prevalence of Micro Flows
At first, we address the question of how prevalent explicit, ob-
servable implicit, and hidden implicit micro flows are among all
operations that induce an information flow. Figure 3 shows the
distribution of micro flows for our benchmarks. The majority of
benchmarks contain both implicit and explicit micro flows. Bench-
mark 39 is a special case where reaching the sink is the first oper-
ation performed on the untrusted data, and hence the data flows
directly from source to sink without producing any micro flow. The
explicit flows are by far the most prevalent, appearing in all but one
benchmarks. Five benchmarks also contain hidden implicit flows,
but we can safely conclude that these cases are rare.
4.2 Source-to-sink Flows
We now evaluate source-to-sink flows, which are the ultimate mea-
sure of success for an information flow analysis. Source-to-sink
flows are what a security analysts ultimately cares about: how does
information from a sensitive source reaches an insensitive sink.
Information flow analysis has no way to show that such a flow is
security-relevant, but it is the analyst’s job to further inspect the
flows and decide. In this section, however, we have a different goal
and setup: we start with a set of known security problems that
produce a source-to-sink flow and proceed by showing what type
of analysis is needed to detect these problems.
Our tool can enforce different security conditions (cf. Section 3.3).
For example, if we are interested only in explicit and observable
implicit flows, we can run the tool in observable tracking mode and
enforce observable secrecy. Figure 4 presents the number of source-
to-sink flows detected by different monitoring strategies. All the
integrity vulnerabilities can be detected by taint tracking only, and
all the security violations in our data set can be detected through
observable tracking. Moreover, all the Node.js vulnerabilities can be
detected by the taint tracking only, independently of whether they
are confidentiality or integrity vulnerabilities. We argue that this
is because our Node.js programs are expected to be trusted. That
is, a security issue may arise from a programming error, but not
by malicious intention. This assumption does not hold, however,
for the fingerprinting and history sniffing benchmarks, where only
observable implicit flows contribute to the source-to-sink flows.
A second explanation for why the implicit flows are prevalent in
the browser environment is that there are already a set of security
mechanisms in the browser that prevent certain type of dangerous
behavior. For example when fingerprinting the login state using
images, an attacker cannot directly read the bytes of the image due
to same origin policy, and hence it relies on measuring its width.
We analyzed in detail the additional source-to-sink flows de-
tected by observable tracking for benchmarks 12, 26, 34, 43, and 44,
and by PU for benchmark 34. In all these cases the reported flows
are false positives, since they do not allow an attacker to exploit
the respective vulnerability. In Section 4.4, we discuss in detail why
these false positives occur when data is propagated through implicit
flows.
Our results indicate that observable tracking is enough to tackle
all the real-life security problemswe consider and that taint tracking
suffices for all the trusted code. We do not claim that there are
no real-life security problems beyond observable secrecy, we just
do not see any in our data set. Moreover, we believe that when
strong controls are in place, attackers will be motivated to use more
sophisticated attacks, possibly though the use of hidden implicit
flows. However, tracking these flows is expensive as we will see in
the remainder of this section.
4.3 Permissiveness
A potential problem for adopting information flow analysis in prac-
tice is its limited permissiveness, i.e., the fact that a monitor may
terminate the program even though no data flows from a source
to a sink. Our metrics allow us to quantify this effect both for the
NSU and the PU monitoring strategies. Specifically, we measure
how many code locations a user would have to inspect because a
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Figure 5: Number of violations, summarized by code loca-
tions, raised by NSU and PU monitors.
monitor terminates the program. The NSU monitor terminates the
program when an update of an insensitive variable is performed
in a sensitive context. This condition corresponds to observable
implicit micro flows and we count the number of code locations
where such a flow occurs. The PU monitor terminates the program
when an insensitive variable that was updated in a sensitive context
is read. This termination condition corresponds to the locations
where our tool inserts an upgrade statement. Figure 5 shows the
number of code locations affected by the lack of permissiveness
for NSU and PU. We exclude benchmarks for which neither of the
monitoring strategies raises an alarm. On average, NSU throws 5.46
times more alarms than PU, that is, PU is much more practical than
NSU. However, when comparing the PU violations to the number
of source-to-sink flows that require PU (Figure 4), we observe that
most of the PU alarms do not translate to actual source-to-sink
flows and should be considered false positives.
4.4 Label Creep Ratio
As a second metric for the cost of different kinds of flows, we
use the Label Creep Ratio (LCR) defined in Section 3.2.1. For each
benchmark and monitoring strategy, we measure how the LCR
changes during the execution time. Figure 6a shows the ratio for
PU monitoring. The metric is not monotonically increasing because
the analysis is flow-sensitive, i.e., the security label of a variable
may change over time. Nevertheless, the LCR steadily increases for
most benchmarks, which confirms the label creep problem. Because
our policies are targeted at detecting known security problems in
the benchmarks, the maximum LCR reached is relatively low (20%,
on average).
A comparison of different monitoring strategies shows that
stricter monitoring causes more label creep. On average, observable
tracking has a 0.3% smaller LCR than PU; a taint tracking analy-
sis has a 45.4% smaller LCR than observable tracking. Figure 6b
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Figure 6: LCR over execution time
1 // query marked 'sensitive ':
2 function parseQuery(query) {
3 // query pushed on the stack:
4 if(query instanceof Function) {
5 var nF = eval(query); // sink call
6 return [new Part(null , '$', nF)];
7 }
8 }
9 function Part(f, operator , operand , p){
10 if(p === undefined)
11 p = []; // implicit
12 this.field = f; // implicit
13 this.operator = operator; // implicit
14 }
Figure 7: Implicit flows snippet from benchmark 11.
illustrates this effect with a representative benchmark (number 11).
The graph shows how label creep increases for observable tracking
compared to taint tracking.
We illustrate with the same benchmark 11 how label creep may
translate to false positives. By revisiting Figure 4, we observe that
the implicit flows do not contribute additional source-to-sink vi-
olations compared to a taint analysis. Figure 7 shows an excerpt
of the source code of the benchmark. The code is vulnerable to
code injection, where query is the source and eval is the sink. The
source-to-sink flow is trivial since the sensitive data is directly
passed to the sink at line 3, which a taint tracker easily detects.
Table 3: Number of instrumented operations handling sen-
sitive data for different benchmarks and monitors.
Explicit Secrecy Observable Secrecy Non Interference
Min Avg Max Min Avg Max Min Avg Max
Command injection 10 59,339 1,118,862 10 59,383 1,118,910 10 59,540 1,118,941
ReDoS vuln. 3 210 2,064 3 540 6,152 3 633 7,073
Buffer vuln. 98 5,740 24,690 98 6,007 24,748 98 6,084 24,843
Client-side progr. 4 5,919 40,364 14 19,555 134,765 16 20,890 136,502
In addition, observable tracking pushes the query on the security
stack at line 2, which causes implicit flows at lines 10 and 11 where
two constants are written to memory. For detecting code injections,
these flows are irrelevant. For example, suppose we have a state-
ment eval(this.operator) at line 12, for which observable tracking
would report a source-to-sink flow. This source-to-sink flow would
be a false positive because the attacker can only control whether
the call to eval happens, not what value flows into it.
4.5 Runtime Overhead
The last cost metric we use is a proxy measure for the runtime over-
head imposed by different monitors. For each benchmark we count
the number of operations that propagate a label or that modify the
security stack. Table 3 shows how the number of events depends on
the kind of monitor, aggregated by the different types of vulnera-
bilities we consider. As expected, raising the security bar translates
into larger runtime overhead. Interestingly, this increase is not uni-
form across the different types of benchmarks. For injections, the
cost increase is relatively small, while for ReDoS and client-side
programs the increase between explicit and observable secrecy is
more than 2.5-fold. We hypothesize that this is due to the structure
of the programs: when comparing these findings with the micro
flows in Figure 3, we see that implicit flows are more common in
ReDoS and client-side programs than in injections. The price paid
to track implicit flows in the client-side benchmarks translates to
detected source-to-sink flows, as we have seen in Section 4.2, while
this is not the case for ReDoS vulnerabilities.
4.6 Threats to Validity
The validity of the conclusions drawn from our study is subject to
several threats. First, our dynamic information flow analysis uses
a simple model for native functions (Section 3.4), which may not
accurately capture all effects of these functions. To minimize the
influence of this limitation, we focus the study on subject programs
that have relatively few native calls. We also wrote a set of precise
models for some of the array and string native functions. Second,
our results are limited to the programs we consider and may not
generalize to other programs or classes of programs. In particular,
we mostly consider non-malicious programs, where difficult-to-
analyze flows may be less prevalent than in malicious code. Our
methodology is generic enough to be easily applied to other pro-
grams. Finally, the hidden implicit flows that our methodology can
observe are bounded by the upgrade statements inserted into the
programs, which in turn depend on the tests we use to exercise the
programs. To mitigate this threat we constructed tests in a way that
increases the sensitive branch coverage. However, multiple paths
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Table 4: JavaScript information flow analyses and the flows
they support: ✓= considers this flow, - = does not consider
this flow,NSU and PU =may abort due to NSU or PU checks,
respectively, andMOD = may modify program behavior.
Work Analysis Explicit Obs. Hidden
Vogt et al. [48] dynamic ✓ ✓ -
Jang et al. [27] hybrid ✓ ✓ -
Chugh et al. [15] hybrid ✓ ✓ ✓
Tripp et al. [47] hybrid ✓ - -
Chudnov & Naumann [14] dynamic ✓ ✓ NSU
Hedin et al. [25] dynamic ✓ ✓ NSU
Bichhawat et al. [11] dynamic ✓ ✓ PU
Kerschbaumer et al. [31] dynamic ✓ ✓ -
Bauer et al. [9] dynamic ✓ - -
De Groef et al. [17] dynamic MOD MOD MOD
Austin & Flanagan [6] dynamic MOD MOD MOD
cannot be covered due to a variety of reasons, e.g., error cases that
cannot be easily triggered or unfeasible execution paths. Despite
these limitations, our study produces interesting insights about the
kinds of flows that appear in real-world JavaScript programs and
the cost-benefit tradeoff of information flow analysis.
5 RELATEDWORK
Denning and Denning pioneered the development and formal de-
scription of static information flow analyses [19, 20]. Fenton studies
purely dynamic information flow monitors [23]. A huge body of
work has been created during the years to refine Dennings’ and
Fenton’s ideas and to adapt them to various programming lan-
guages. Table 4 presents some of the more recent tools and shows
what kinds of flows they consider. Many analyses consider only
explicit flows [42]. Among the analyses that consider implicit flows,
the majority stop or modify the program as soon as a hidden flow
occurs.
Information Flow Analysis for JavaScript Chugh et al. pro-
pose a static-dynamic analysis that reports flows from code given to
eval() to sensitive locations, such as the location bar of a site [15].
Austin and Flanagan address the problem of hidden implicit flows [4,
5], as discussed in detail in Section 2. Hedin et al. propose a dy-
namic analysis that implements the NSU strategy for a subset
of JavaScript [26]. They develop JSFlow, which supports the full
JavaScript language, but it requires inserting upgrade statements
manually [25]. Birgisson et al. propose to automatically insert up-
grade statements [12] by iteratively executing tests under the NSU
monitor. Their approach is implemented for a JavaScript-like lan-
guage, whereas we support the full JavaScript language. Our moni-
tor implements the PU strategy to insert upgrade statements, which
reduces the number of upgrade statements and increases permis-
siveness. Bichhawat et al. propose a variant of PU, where the pro-
gram is terminated whenever a partially leaked value may flow
into the heap [10]. A WebKit-based browser by Kerschbaumer et
al. [31] balances performance and permissiveness by probabilisti-
cally switching between taint tracking and observable tracking and
deploys crowdsourcing techniques to discover information flow
violations by Alexa Top 500 pages.
OtherWork on Information FlowAnalysis Balliu et al. study
a family of information flow trackers for different kinds of flows
and propose security conditions to evaluate their soundness [7]. We
borrow their conditions to prove the soundness of our monitor for
NanoJS. Bao et al. show that considering implicit flows can cause
a significant amount of false positives and propose a criterion to
determine a subset of all conditionals to consider [8]. Chandra et al.
propose a VM-based analysis for Java that combines a conservative
static analysis with a dynamic analysis to track all three kinds of
flows considered in this paper [13]. Dytan is a dynamic information
flow analysis for binaries that supports both explicit and observable
implicit flows [16]. Myers and Liskov introduce Jif, a language for
specifying and statically enforcing security policies for Java pro-
grams [36]. A survey by Sabelfeld and Myers provides an overview
of further static approaches [39].
Applications of Information FlowAnalysis Information flow
analysis is widely used to discover potential vulnerabilities. All ap-
proaches we are aware of consider only a subset of the three kinds
of flows. Flax uses taint analysis to find incomplete or missing input
validation and generates attacks that try to exploit the potential vul-
nerabilities [40]. Lekies et al. [33] and Melicher et al. [35] propose a
similar approach to detect DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities. Jang et
al. analyze various web sites with information flow policies targeted
at common privacy leaks and attack vectors, such as cookie steal-
ing and history sniffing [27]. Their analysis considers observable
implicit flows but not hidden implicit flows. Sabre analyzes flows
inside browser extensions to discover malicious extensions [21].
Their analysis considers only explicit flows.
Studies of Information Flow King et al. [32] share our goal of
understanding practical trade-offs between explicit and implicit
flows. They empirically study implicit flows detected by a static
analysis in six Java-based implementations of authentication and
cryptographic functions. They report that most of the reported
policy violations are false positives, mostly due to conservative
handling of exceptions. Our work focuses on dynamic analysis
for JavaScript-based implementations, which gives rise to a class
of observable secrecy monitors that is not relevant in a static set-
ting. Another empirical study of information flows is by Masri et
al. [34]. Their work studies how the length of flows (measured as
the length of the static dependence chain), the strength of flows
(measured based on entropy and correlations), and different kinds
of information flows (explicit and observable implicit) relate to each
other. Similar to our methodology, Masri et al. target dynamic anal-
ysis. Our work differs by addressing different research questions, a
different language, and by considering hidden implicit flows.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents an empirical study of information flows in real-
world programs. Based on novel metrics to capture the prevalence
of explicit, observable implicit, and hidden implicit flows, as well
as the costs they involve, we study 56 JavaScript programs that
suffer from real-world security problems. Our results show that
implicit flows are expensive to track in terms of permissiveness,
label creep, and runtime overhead. We find taint tracking to be
sufficient for most of the studied security problems, while for some
privacy scenarios observable tracking is needed. Our work helps
security analysts and analysis developers to better understand the
cost-benefits tradeoffs of information flow analysis. Furthermore,
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our findings highlight the need for future research on cost-effective
ways to analyze hidden implicit information flows.
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A SECURITY DEFINITIONS
The previous section has formally defined the flow counting that is
at the heart of our empirical study. We now related the flow count-
ing to three previously described [7] security conditions: Explicit
secrecy, which requires the absence of explicit flows, observable
secrecy, which requires the absence of both explicit flows and ob-
servable hidden flows, and non-interference, which requires the
absence of all three kinds of flows, i.e., explicit flows, observable
implicit flows, and hidden implicit flows. To describe these security
conditions in our formalization, we define an instrumented version
of the semantics that, along with counting flows, extracts another
program. Intuitively, the extracted program preserves the semantics
of the original program execution but exposes only a subset of all
flows.
To formalize non-interference, we first refer to low-equivalence
on environments and heaps. Two environments and heaps are low-
equivalent if they are equal on all insensitive values. For example,
when considering integrity, the two states are equal on all non-
attacker-controlled variables. Dually, for confidentiality, this means
that the attacker cannot observe any difference between the two
states. Non-interference is defined in terms of low-equivalence
of initial environments and heaps. Intuitively, an execution satis-
fies non-interference iff the same trace can be produced for any
indistinguishable starting environment and heap.
Definition 1 (Non-interference). A program c satisfies non-
interference for environment ρ1 and heaph1, iff whenever ⟨c, ρ1,h1, [], 0⟩
τ−→⋆ ⟨c ′, ρ ′1,h′1, t ′1,κ ′1⟩, then for all ρ2, h2, where (ρ1,h1) =L (ρ2,h2),
it holds that ⟨c, ρ2,h2, [], 0⟩ τ−→
⋆
cnf ′ for some cnf ′.
Explicit secrecy and observable secrecy are both defined by ex-
tracting a simpler program during the execution of a programwhich
eliminates information flows not considered by the security condi-
tion: Programs extracted by explicit secrecy contain no control-flow
information, whereas programs extracted by observable secrecy dis-
card statements in untaken branches, thus removing leaks through
not executed statements in other branches in the program.
The following describes the program extraction formally. We
extend each configuration cnf with an extracted statement ce , writ-
ten (cnf , ce ), where cnf ∈ Conf and ce ∈ A with A referring to
the set of extracted statements for a given security condition. For
each security condition, we below define an extraction extraction
function E : Conf ×A→ A and then use E in the execution steps
of the instrumented semantics: (cnf , ce ) τ−→E (cnf ,E(cnf , ce )).
Explicit secrecy: For explicit secrecy, we disregard control-
flow-related statements by defining an extraction function expl.
Intuitively, the extracted program discards all control-flow decisions
that influenced the current execution and extracts only the straight-
line portion of the current execution. As a result, the extracted
program no longer contains any implicit flows. The extraction
function for explicit secrecy is defined as follows:
expl(⟨x = e, . . .⟩, ce ) = ce ; x = e
expl(⟨sink(f ), . . .⟩, ce ) = ce ; sink(f )
expl(⟨x .y = e, . . .⟩, ce ) = ce ; x .y = e
expl(⟨c1 ; c2, . . .⟩, ce ) = expl(⟨c1, . . .⟩, ce )
expl(⟨. . .⟩, ce ) = ce
Based on this extraction function, we can define explicit secrecy:
Definition 2. A program c satisfies explicit secrecy for ρ and h iff
whenever (⟨c, ρ,h,κ, S⟩, skip) τ−→⋆expl (⟨c ′, env ′,h′,κ ′, S ′⟩, c ′e ), then
c ′e is non-interfering for environment ρ and heap h.
Observable secrecy: To define observable secrecy we first de-
fine evaluation contexts to keep track of where in a partially ex-
tracted program the next statement should be placed. The set Cxt
of evaluation contexts is defined by the following grammar:
Cxt ::= • | Stmt ; Cxt | if (e) { Cxt } else { skip } |
if (e) { skip } else { Cxt }
Note that with the exception of •, symbolizing a hole in the context,
evaluation contexts are a subset of statements. We denote replacing
• by a statement or context c in a context cxt by cxt[c]. Note that if
c ∈ Stmt, then cxt[c] ∈ Stmt.
We then define an extraction function obs : Conf × Cxt → Cxt
to define observable secrecy:
obs(⟨x = e, . . .⟩, cxt) = cxt[x = e ; •]
obs(⟨x .y = e, . . .⟩, cxt) = cxt[x .y = e ; •]
obs(⟨sink(f ), . . .⟩, cxt) = cxt[sink(f ) ; •]
obs(⟨c1 ; c2, . . .⟩, cxt) = obs(⟨c1, . . .⟩, cxt)
obs(⟨if (e) { c1 } else { c2 }, ρ, h, . . .⟩, cxt) ={
cxt[if (e) { • } else { skip }] JeK(ρ, h) = tt
cxt[if (e) { skip } else { • }] otherwise
obs(⟨pop, . . .⟩, cxt) = leaveBranch(cxt)
obs(⟨. . .⟩, cxt) = cxt
where leaveBranch denotes shifting the hole in the context outside
of the branch of the surrounding if. Note that in programs not
initially containing pop statements, any pop encountered during
execution delimits a control-flow construct.
B SOUNDNESS
In this section, we show that if a particular execution results in zero
explicit flows, this execution satisfies explicit secrecy. Similarly, if
both observable and explicit flow counts are zero, the run satisfies
observable secrecy.
Theorem B.1. If (⟨c, ρ,h, t ,κ⟩, skip) τ−→⋆expl (⟨ε, ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′⟩, ce )
and ∀(l ,κ) ∈ τ . κ(E) = 0, then ce satisfies explicit secrecy for ρ and
h.
Proofs for the two theorems are provided in Appendix C.
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Theorem B.2. If (⟨c, ρ,h, t0,κ⟩, •) τ−→
⋆ (⟨ε, ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′⟩, ce ) and
∀(l ,κ) ∈ τ . κ(E) = κ(O) = 0, then ce [skip] satisfies observable
secrecy for ρ and h.
We omit a similar soundness statement for non-interference, as
the monitor follows the same approach as a traditional permissive-
upgrade-based information flow monitor, under the additional as-
sumption that all required upgrade statements were inserted during
the testing phase.
C PROOFS AND ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS
We formally define values and objects as follows. The sets are
defined by (mutual-)inductively:
n ∈ Base κ ∈ Cnt
nκ ∈ Value
a ∈ Addr κ ∈ Cnt
aκ ∈ Value
V ⊂fin Name f ∈ (V → Value)
f ∈ Obj
The formal definition of joining the labels of values is given by⊔(h,n(ℓ,κ)) = ℓ ifn ∈ Base and⊔(h,a) = ⊔x ∈dom(h(a)) (⊔(h,h(x)))
if a ∈ Addr . The helper function toVal(h,v) : {Base×Name⋆} is de-
fined as follows: toVal(h,b) = {(b, [])} if b ∈ Base, and toVal(h, r ) =
{(b ′,p.[x])|(b ′,p) ∈ toVal(h,h(x)),x ∈ dom(h)}
The remaining rules for the operational semantics are the fol-
lowing:
E-Skip
⟨skip, ρ, h, t, κ ⟩ −→ ⟨ε, ρ, h, t, κ ⟩
E-AssignFieldJxK(ρ, h) = ax ax ∈ Addr o = h(ax ) y ∈ dom(o)Jx .yK(ρ, h) = vxy κxy =⊔(h, vxy ) JeK(ρ, h) = vκ
κ′ = κ + ∆(κxy, κ, t ) o′ = o[y 7→ vκ′ ] h′ = h[ax 7→ o′]
⟨x .y = e, ρ, h, t, κ ⟩ −→ ⟨ε, ρ, h′, t, κ ⟩
E-While
⟨while e do c, ρ, h, t, κ ⟩ −→
⟨if (e) { c ; while e do c } else { ε }, ρ, h, t, κ ⟩
E-UpgradeHJxK(ρ, h) = vκ κ , 0
⟨upgrade(x ), ρ, h, t, κ ⟩ −→ ⟨ε, ρ, h, t, κ ⟩
E-Seq
⟨c1, ρ, h, t, κ ⟩ τ−→ ⟨c′1, ρ′, h′, t ′, κ′⟩
⟨c1 ; c2, ρ, h, t, κ ⟩ τ−→ ⟨c′1 ; c2, ρ′, h′, t ′, κ′⟩
E-SeqEmpty
⟨ε ; c, ρ, h, t, κ ⟩ −→ ⟨c, ρ, h, t, κ ⟩
Two environments and heaps (ρ1,h1) and (ρ2,h2) are low-equivalent,
written ρ1 =L ρ2 iff
∀x . κ(ρ1(x)) = κ(ρ2(x)) ∧ (κ(ρ1(x)) = 0 ⇒ toVal(h, ρ1(x)) =
toVal(h, ρ2(x))), dom(h1) = dom(h2), ∀r ∈ dom(h1). κ(h1(r )) =
κ(h2(r )) ∧ (κ(h1(r )) = 0⇒ toVal(h1,h1(r )) = toVal(h2,h2(r )).
In the interest of brevity, we elide lemmas about standard prop-
erties of the evaluation relation in the following proofs.
Proof of Theorem B.1. We define κ0 = (0, 0, 0). We define an
safety property IE (ρ0,h0) ⊆ Stmt on extracted programs as follows:
c ∈ IE (ρ0,h0) :⇔ (∀ρ,h. (ρ,h) =L (ρ0,h0) ∧ ⟨c, ρ,h, [],κ0⟩ τ−→
⋆
⟨c ′, ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′⟩∧(c ′ = sink(e)∨c ′ = sink(e) ; c2) ⇒ ⊔(e,h) = 0).
Moreover, we note that only straight-line programs are extracted
for explicit secrecy and such programs trivially preserve low equiv-
alence of environments and heaps.
Additionally, we define the predicate B(ρ0,h0, ρ ′0,h′0) ⊆ Stmt
where ce ∈ B iff whenever (ρ0,h0) ≤ (ρ,h), (ρ0,h0) =L (ρ,h),
and ⟨ce , ρ,h, [],κ0⟩ τ−→
⋆ ⟨ε, ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′⟩, then (ρ ′,h′) ≤ (env ′0,h′0),
where (ρ,h) ≤ (ρ0,h0) iff the counter of each value in ρ and h is
related by ⊑ to the corresponding counter in ρ0 and h0. Formally,
(ρ1,h1) ≤ (ρ2,h2) iff ∀x v1 κ1 v2 κ2. ρ1(x) = vκ11 ∧ ρ2(x) = vκ22 ⇒
κ1 ⊑ κ2, dom(h1) = dom(h2), and ∀a v1 κ1 v2 κ2. h1(a) = vκ11 ∧
h2(a) = vκ22 ⇒ κ1 ⊑ κ2.
For the induction to succeed we show the stronger statement
that whenever (⟨c, ρ0,h0, [],κ0⟩, skip) τ0−→
⋆ (⟨c ′, ρ ′0,h′0, [],κ ′0⟩, c ′e ),
then c ′e ∈ IE (ρ0,h0) and ce ∈ B(ρ0,h0, ρ ′0,h′0).
We prove this by induction on (⟨c, ρ0,h0, [],κ0⟩, skip) τ0−→
⋆ (⟨c ′,
ρ ′0,h
′
0, [],κ ′0⟩, c ′e ). The reflexive case is trivial. For the transitive
case, assume (⟨c, ρ0,h0, [],κ0⟩, skip) τ0−→ (⟨c ′, ρ ′0,h′0, t ′,κ ′0⟩, ce )
τ ′0−→
(⟨c ′′, ρ ′′0 ,h′′0 , t ′′,κ ′′0 ⟩, c ′e ). Per the induction hypothesis we have
that ce ∈ IE (ρ0,h0) and ce ∈ B(ρ0,h0, ρ ′0,h′0). We show that c ′e ∈
IE (ρ0,h0) and c ′e ∈ B(ρ0,h0, ρ ′′0 ,h′′0 ) by induction on ⟨c ′, ρ ′0,h′0,
t ′,κ ′0⟩
τ ′0−→ ⟨c ′′, ρ ′′0 ,h′′0 , t ′′,κ ′′0 ⟩. The main interesting cases are E-
Assign, E-AssignField, and E-Sink.
Case E-Assign: We have that c ′e = ce ; x = e . We have that c ′e ∈
IE (ρ0,h0) follows from the fact that any sink in c ′e is also reachable
in ce , hence the claim follows from the induction hypothesis.
To show c ′e ∈ B(ρ0,h0, ρ ′′0 ,h′′0 ), we note that if ⟨c ′e , ρ,h, [],κ0⟩
τ0−→⋆
⟨ε, env ′′,h′′, t ′′,κ ′′⟩ then ⟨c ′e , ρ,h, [],κ0⟩
τ0−→⋆ ⟨x = e, ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′⟩
and ρ ′′ = ρ ′(x := ve ), where ve is the result of the assigned expres-
sion with incremented counters. We show that the label of x is still
bounded by the corresponding label of x in ρ ′′0 . From the induction
hypothesis we have that (ρ ′,h′) ≤ (ρ ′0,h′0). If the new label of x
in (ρ ′0,h′0) is not 0, then the claim follows trivially. If it is low, it
follows from the previous fact that x also receives 0 in ρ ′′,h′′.
Case E-AssignField is analogous.
Case E-Sink: In this case c ′e ∈ B(ρ0,h0, ρ ′′0 ,h′′0 ) follows easily
from the induction hypothesis as the sink statement does not change
the environment and heap. c ′e ∈ IE (ρ0,h0) follows trivially for sink
statements already reachable in ce . Since c ′e = ce ; sink(e), we need
to show that this also holds when reaching c ′e . Since the explicit
flow count is still 0 in κ ′′0 , we have that this the label of e in (ρ ′0,h′0)
is 0. Since (ρ ′,h′) ≤ (ρ ′0,h′0), we have that therefore the label of e
in ρ ′,h′ is also 0, as desired.
Clearly whenever c ∈ IE (ρ0,h0), then c satisfies per-run non-
interference wrt. ρ0 and h0 since low equivalence between mem-
ories is preserved and only low expression reach sinks without
increasing the counter. □
In the following proof sketch, we define π1,2((a,b, c)) = (a,b)
and overload 0 to be any n-tuple of 0s. The ⊑ relation is generalized
similarly to arbitrary tuples.
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Proof of Theorem B.2. For the induction to go through, we
show the stronger property that whenever (⟨c, ρ,h, [],κ0⟩, •) τ−→
⋆
(⟨c ′, ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′⟩, ce ), (ρ,h) =L (ρ2,h2), and π1,2(κ ′) = 0, then:
• ⟨ce , ρ,h, [],κ0⟩ τ−→
⋆ ⟨• ; poplength(t ′), ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′1⟩, andπ1,2(κ ′1) =
π1,2(κ ′) (1) and
• There exist ρ ′2, h′2, t ′2, κ ′2 and S ′2 such that (⟨ce , ρ2,h2, [],κ0
τ−→⋆
⟨• ; poplength(t ′), ρ ′2,h′2, t ′2,κ ′2⟩⟩ ∧ length(t ′) = length(t ′2)) ∨ (⟨ce ,
ρ2,h2, [],κ0⟩ τ−→
⋆ ⟨ε,h′2, t ′2,κ ′2⟩ ∧
⊔
t ′ = H) (2).
• Moreover, (ρ ′,h′) =W (ρ ′2,h′2) (ρ ′2,h′2) ≤ (ρ ′,h′), and t ′2 ⪯ t ′. (3)
where ρ1 =W ρ2 holds iff all values labeled low in both environ-
ments are equal in value and lists of levels xs and ys satisfy xs ⪯ ys
if there exists a suffix of length length(xs) of ys such that all levels
are pairwise related by ⊑. We write cn for n copies of c composed
with sequential composition.
We show this by induction on (⟨c, ρ,h, [],κ0⟩, •) τ−→
⋆ (⟨c ′, ρ ′,
h′, t ′,κ ′⟩, ce ). The reflexive case is trivial. For the transitive case,
assume (⟨c, ρ,h, [],κ0⟩, •) τ−→
⋆ (⟨c ′, ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′⟩, ce ) τ
′
−→ (⟨c ′′, ρ ′′,
h′′, t ′′,κ ′′⟩, c ′e ). From part (1) of the induction hypothesis we have
that ⟨ce , ρ,h, [],κ⟩ τ−→
⋆ ⟨• ; poplength(t ′), ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′⟩ (1′); from
part (2) we obtain ρ ′2,h′2, t ′2,κ ′2 for which the corresponding dis-
junction also holds (2′); from (3) we have (ρ ′,h′) =W (ρ ′2,h′2),(ρ ′2,h′2) ≤ (ρ ′,h′), and t ′2 ⪯ t ′. We show (1 − 3) by induction on
(⟨c ′, ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′⟩, ce ) τ
′
−→ (⟨c ′′, ρ ′′,h′′, t ′′,κ ′′⟩, c ′e ); the interesting
cases are E-Assign, E-AssignField, E-IfTrue/False, E-Sink, and
E-Pop. We refer to the proof obligations as (1′′′), (2′′′), and (3′′′).
Case E-Assign: (1′′) follows trivially from the semantics. We
have c ′e = ce [x = e ; •], ρ ′′ = ρ ′[x 7→ ve ], where ve is the result of
evaluating e in ρ ′,h′ and incrementing the counts appropriately.
We proceed by case distinction on (2′). If ⟨ce , ρ2,h2, [],κ0⟩ τ−→
⋆
⟨• ; poplength(t ′2), ρ ′2,h′2, t ′2,κ ′2⟩, then we have that ⟨c ′e , ρ2,h2, [],
κ0⟩ τ−→ ⟨x = e ; • ; poplength(t ′2), ρ ′2,h′2, t ′2,κ ′2⟩
[]−→ ⟨• ; poplength(t ′2),
ρ ′′2 ,h
′
2, t
′
2,κ
′
2⟩ where ρ ′′2 = ρ ′2[x 7→ v2e ], where v2e is the result of
evaluating e in ρ ′2,h
′
2. length(t ′2) = length(t ′) follows from this case
in (2′) and the fact that assignments do not modify the label stack.
In the case where ⟨c ′e , ρ2,h2, [],κ0⟩
τ−→⋆ ⟨ε, ρ ′2,h′2, t ′2,κ ′2⟩, then
we have that
⊔(t ′) , 0. Therefore, we have that the counter of
ρ ′′(x) is not 0, therefore (ρ ′′2 ,h′2) =W (ρ ′′,h′′) and (ρ ′′2 ,h′2) ≤(ρ ′′,h′′) follows trivially.
The other statements follow from the induction hypothesis: If •
is not reached, then ce [c2] matches the evaluation of ce for any c2.
Case E-AssignField: Analogous to E-Assign.
Case E-If: Without loss of generality, we only discuss the case
where the then branch is taken. In this case, we first note that ρ ′′ =
ρ ′, h′′ = h′ and t ′′ = κe .t ′ where JeK(ρ ′,h′) = vκee ; in particular
note that length(t ′′) = length(t ′)+ 1. For (1′′) note that from (1′) it
follows that ⟨c ′e , ρ,h, [],κ0⟩
τ−→⋆ ⟨if (e) { • } else { poplength(t ′) } ;
, ρ ′,h′, t ′,κ ′⟩ []−→ ⟨• ; poplength(t ′+1), ρ ′,h′, t ′′,κ ′⟩ as desired.
We proceed by case distinction on (2′). If ⟨ce , ρ2,h2, [],κ0⟩ τ−→
⋆
⟨• ; poplength(t ′2), ρ ′2,h′2, t ′2,κ ′2⟩ and length(t ′2) = length(t ′), then
we have that ⟨c ′e , ρ2,h2, [],κ0⟩
τ−→⋆ ⟨if (e) { • } else { skip } ;
poplength(t ′), ρ ′2,h
′
2, t
′
2,κ
′
2⟩. Note that for JeK(ρ ′2,h′2) = vκ2e2 and
(ρ ′2,h′2) ≤ (ρ ′,h′) we have that κ2e ⊑ κe .
To show (2′′)we proceed by case distinction onv2 = tt. Ifv2 = tt,
we have that ⟨if (e) { • } else { skip } ; poplength(t ′), ρ ′2,h′2, t ′′2 ,κ ′2⟩
[]−→
⟨• ; poplength(t ′)+1, ρ ′2,h′2, t ′′2 ,κ ′2⟩ where t ′′2 = κ2e .t ′2. Since κ2e ⊑ κe ,
we have that t ′′2 ⪯ t ′′; we also have that length(t ′′2 ) = length(t ′′)
trivially.
In the case wherev2 , tt, we have that ⟨if (e) { • } else { skip } ;
poplength(t ′), ρ ′2,h
′
2, t
′′
2 ,κ
′
2⟩
[]−→ ⟨skip ; poplength(t ′)+1, ρ ′2,h′2, t ′′2 ,
κ ′2⟩
[]−→
⋆
⟨ε, ρ ′2,h′2, t ′′′2 ,κ ′2⟩ where t ′′′2 is a prefix of t ′′2 and hence,
t ′′′2 ⪯ t ′′.
Note that since v2 , ve and (ρ ′2,h′2) =W (ρ ′,h′), we have that
κ ′′ , 0 as required for this case.
where v2e is the result of evaluating e in ρ ′2,h
′
2. length(t ′2) =
length(t ′) follows from this case in (2′) and the fact that assignments
do not modify the label stack.
In the case where ⟨ce , ρ2,h2, [],κ0⟩ τ−→
⋆ ⟨ε, ρ ′2,h′2, t ′2,κ ′2⟩ and⊔(t ′) , 0, we have that then ⟨c ′e , ρ2,h2, [],κ0⟩ τ−→⋆ ⟨ε, ρ ′2,h′2, t ′2,κ ′2⟩
since • is not reached and hence replacing it with if (e) { • } else { skip }
does not affect the execution. Since t ′2 ⪯ t ′, we trivially have that
then also t ′2 ⪯ κe .t ′. In both cases, the rest of (3′′) follows trivially.
Case E-Sink: We have that c ′e = ce [sink(e) ; •], τ ′ = [v] where
vκv = JeK(ρ ′,h′). Environments and the heap are unchanged. More-
over, we have that (fst(κ ′′), snd(κ ′′)) = (fst(κ ′), snd(κ ′)), since the
flow counts are assumed to be 0. (1′′′) follows easily.
For (2′′), note the second alternative of the disjunction of (2′)
leads to a contradiction, since then t ′′ , 0 and this would imply
that π1,2(κ ′′) , 0, violating the assumption that π1,2(κ ′′) = 0.
We can therefore assume that ⟨ce , ρ2,h2, [],κ0⟩ τ−→
⋆ ⟨• ; poplength(t ′2),
ρ ′2,h
′
2, t
′
2,κ
′
2⟩ and length(t ′2) = length(t ′). Hence we also have that
⟨c ′e , ρ2,h2, [],κ0⟩
τ−→⋆ ⟨sink(e) ; • ; poplength(t ′2), ρ ′2,h′2, t ′2,κ ′2⟩
v2−−→
⟨• ; poplength(t ′2), ρ2,h2, t2,κ ′2⟩. Since π1,2(κ ′′) = 0, we also have
that the label of v is 0; from (ρ ′2,h′2) ≤ (ρ ′,h′) we have that v2 is
also labeled 0. With (ρ ′,h′) =W (ρ ′2,h′2) this yields that v = v2,
concluding (2′′). (3′′) follows easily since heaps, environments, and
the label stack are not modified by executing a sink statement.
Case E-Pop: By this case we have c ′e = leaveBranch(ce ). (1′′)
follows easily. For (2′′) we again proceed by case distinction on the
disjunction in (2′). In the first case, the conclusion follows easily,
since we reach the same state as the execution in (ρ ′,h′). Assume
now that ⟨ce , ρ2,h2, [],κ0⟩ τ−→
⋆ ⟨ε, ρ ′2,h′2, t ′2,κ ′2⟩ and
⊔
t ′ , 0. We
proceed by case distinction on this execution reaching the branch
surrounding • in ce . We denote this branch by if (e) { c1 } else { c2 };
WLOG assume that c2 = skip and c1 = c ′1 ; •. Then, we show
⟨c ′e , ρ2,h2, [],κ0⟩
τ−→⋆ ⟨• ; poplength(t ′′), ρ ′2,h′2, tl(t ′2),κ ′2⟩: Since ce
terminated without reaching •, we have that JeK(ρ ′2,h′2) , ttκ2 for
any κ2, and, since c2 = skip, we reach • ; poplength(t ′′) trivially,
concluding the induction. This stronger property then trivially
implies non-interference of ce [skip]. □
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